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Vegetarianism and Virtue: Does Consequentialism Demand Too Little?
Nathan Nobis
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester

I will argue that each of us personally ought to be a vegetarian.

1

Actually, the conclusion I will attempt to defend concerns more than one's eating habits in that I will argue
that we should be "vegans." Not only should we not buy and eat meat, but we should also not purchase
fur coats, stoles, and hats, or leather shoes, belts, jackets, purses and wallets, furniture, car interiors, and
other traditionally animal-based products for which there are readily available plant-based or synthetic
alternatives. (Usually these are cheaper and work just as well, or better, anyway.) I will argue that buying
and eating most eggs and dairy products are immoral as well. (Since it's much easier to avoid all fur,
leather, and wool than all eggs and dairy products, I mention those first.) My conclusion might even imply
that outfitting one's self in what has been, in recent history, the most "philosophical" of fabrics—tweed—is
immoral too!
Many arguments defending the moral obligation to become vegetarian and, to a lesser extent, adopt a
2
vegan lifestyle, have been given, especially in recent decades. While these arguments have convinced
3
many to become vegetarians or vegans, most are still not convinced. My discussion is directed towards
those who have not been convinced, especially for these reasons: first, it is often unclear what the
argument is for the exact conclusion that "You, the reader, are morally obligated to be a vegetarian (or a
4
vegan)." Second, it is often unclear what moral premise is given to justify this conclusion. And, third, it is
often especially unclear how this premise might be justified from a broadly consequentialist moral
5
perspective.
This final lack of clarity is somewhat surprising, since much of the contemporary vegetarian movement
6
takes its inspiration from the work of Peter Singer, a self-professed utilitarian consequentialist. He writes,
"I am a utilitarian. I am also a vegetarian. I am a vegetarian because I am a utilitarian. I believe that
applying the principle of utility to our present situation—especially the methods now used to rear animals
for food and the variety of foods available to us—leads to the conclusion that we ought to be
7
vegetarians." While a number of non-consequentialist ethical theories can justify a vegetarian or vegan
8
conclusion fairly easily, I will present some doubts that consequentialism can so easily do so. I will then
attempt to caste doubts on these doubts.
So my target reader is a consequentialist who denies that she ought to become a vegetarian or vegan. As
a consequentialist, she believes this, presumably, because she thinks that her making these changes in
her eating habits and lifestyle would result in her bringing about less intrinsic goods into the world than
were she to maintain her current omnivorous eating and consumer habits. In effect, she thinks that, in
terms of doing what she can to increase the world's overall amount of goodness, there are ways for her to
spend her time and resources that are, at least, morally equivalent to becoming a vegetarian, and so it is
not obligatory. She must also think that her becoming a vegetarian will prevent her from achieving these
other goals that she believes yield equal or, perhaps greater, goods.
Consequentialism is often criticized as being "too demanding," since it demands that we do the best we
can. For most of us this requires doing a lot more than what we're doing now. Since consequentialism
implies that most of us are routinely doing wrong, many conclude that it must be a mistaken moral
9
theory. I will turn this objection on its head and criticize a standard consequentialist perspective on the
grounds that it seems to demand too little. I will argue that if consequentialism does not imply or justify a

moral principle that we should not benefit from or (even symbolically) support very bad practices when we
can easily avoid doing so, then consequentialism is mistaken.
A principle like this has implications not only for ethical vegetarianism or veganism, but for many areas of
personal morality that are motivated from a response to practices that essentially involve unnecessary
suffering and unfairness. If consequentialism implies that we should be morally indifferent in our response
to the factors that motivate people not only in the vegetarian, vegan, and "animal rights" movements, but
in civil rights and "liberation" movements in general (e.g., opposing slavery, "human rights" and labor
movements, bringing women, racial minorities, homosexuals, and other groups fully into the moral
community, etc.), then consequentialism is a far too conservative morality because it demands far too
little of its adherents in terms of their personal lives.
I will attempt to meet this kind of objection and try to show that a kind of consequentialism can justify the
vegetarian or vegan conclusions presented above. This kind of consequentialism is unique in that it takes
the instrumental value of having and acting from certain virtues seriously. Some might respond, "So much
the worse for consequentialism," but this might be unwise, since, as Henry Sidgwick argued, the theory
provides, "a principle of synthesis, and a method for binding the unconnected and occasionally conflicting
10
principles of common moral reasoning into a complete and harmonious system." My discussion is
directed towards someone who thinks that consequentialism does this organizing and synthesizing job
best, but is skeptical that her seemingly well-confirmed theory implies that she should be a vegetarian or
vegan and do her best to develop and act from the virtues that are commonly said to motivate
vegetarianism: compassion, caring, sensitivity to cruelty and suffering (both animal and human),
11
resistance to injustice, and integrity, among others.
Contemporary Animal Agriculture and Human Nutrition
First, I will briefly summarize some facts about modem animal agriculture and human nutrition. While this
information is readily available, relatively few people are aware of it.
Many people become vegetarians or vegans when they learn about modem animal agriculture and
12
slaughter techniques, especially "factory farming." In the U.S., each year around nine billion animals live
in factory farms where most lead generally miserable lives. Newborns are separated from their mothers
hours or days after birth; they are then kept in small cages or crates or confined for most of their lives in
extremely cramped, overcrowded pens. Male chicks at egg farms are discarded by the tens of thousands
each day into trash bins because their meat is deemed unsuitable for human consumption, or they are
ground alive into feed for other animals. Male calves of dairy cows are fed liquid, iron-deficient diets and
raised in crates that wholly restrict movement so that their muscles remain weak and tender.
Most animals are confined indoors: very few live "happy lives" in an outdoor bamyard. This confinement
results in the animals' basic instinctual urges being frustrated. Many animals become psychotic and
exhibit neurotic, repetitive behaviors: many become unnaturally cannibalistic. To ward off death and
disease from the stressful and unsanitary conditions, a constant regimen of antibiotics and growth
hormones is maintained. On both factory and non-intensive family farms animals are subject to surgical
modifications such as beak, toe, and tail removal, ear tagging and clipping, teeth removal, branding,
dehorning, castration, and ovary removal. Li the interest of containing costs, all these procedures are
performed without anesthesia.
13

Many animals die from starvation and exposure to cold in transport to the slaughterhouse. Those that
are unable to walk to slaughter are labeled "downers" and are left to die lying in the yard. Those that
14
remain are slaughtered in extremely painful and inhumane ways. Fur-bearing animals are either trapped

in the wild and typically die a slow, painful death, or are raised in small cages, fed each others' remains,
and killed by anal electrocution so their pelts are not marred.
Understanding these facts is a common motivation for ethical vegetarianism and adopting a vegan
lifestyle: people learn of, especially by seeing, the pain, suffering, and death involved in these practices
and, at least, simply do not want to be involved with or benefit from it anymore.
One might think that this suffering and death is justified because we need to eat meat and other animal
products, but, clearly, nobody needs to eat meat to survive. In fact, the common diet in the U.S. and
Europe, a meat-based diet, is strongly correlated with such health problems as heart disease, stroke,
diabetes, obesity, stroke, and various cancers. Vegetarians are far less prone to these chronic diseases
15
and they tend to outlive meat-eaters by seven years. There is strong medical evidence that not eating
meat is to one's health advantage: even conservative health organizations encourage people to cut back
on their consumption of meat to reduce cholesterol and saturated fat intake; others encourage cutting it
out completely.
The same things, in fact, can be said about all animal products: no one needs to eat eggs or milk or
cheese. Progressive health organizations that advocate preventative medicine, such as the Physician's
Committee for Responsible Medicine, advise eliminating them completely and adopting a vegan diet that
contains a wide variety of foods solely from the four new food groups: vegetables, fruits, legumes (beans
16
and nuts), and whole grains. There is ample evidence that people not only survive on such a diet, but
17
that they thrive. The list of world-champion vegan athletes is impressive, so no one can honestly say
18
that vegans can't achieve optimal health or nutrition. And, of course, no one needs to wear fur, leather,
19
or wool, or use products made from these materials.
Thus, no product of factory farming, non-intensive farming or animal slaughter is necessary for human
health or survival. Animals' short and often miserable lives and cruel and painful deaths are not
outweighed or justified by any human need. As for the aesthetic pleasures of taste and fashion,
vegetarian cuisine and cruelty-free clothing and accessories can easily gratify those interests. But even if
the pleasures of consuming animal-based dishes uniformly outweighed the pleasures of all vegan
alternatives (which they don't), it is exceedingly unlikely that the difference in aesthetic pleasure for us
outweighs the great pains, suffering, and death for the animals. Thus, it is quite unlikely that the status
quo regarding the use and treatment of animals is justified from a consequentialist perspective.
Singer, Regan, and The "Impotence of the Individual" Objection
I now turn to some of the philosophical literature on vegetarianism. I will discuss some recent arguments
for vegetarianism and, from a consequentialist critic's perspective, identify a common difficulty for these
arguments that makes it difficult for them to establish the conclusion that each of us, personally, ought to
be a vegetarian or vegan.
As sketched above. Singer holds that we should be vegetarians because our being vegetarian will
maximize utility: if we were all vegetarians, there would be no demand for meat and so animals would no
longer be inhumanely raised and killed for products that are unnecessary and often harmful for human
health and well-being.
A critic might accept that it is likely that if everyone became a vegetarian (perhaps gradually, so the
economy is not disturbed) utility would be maximized, but object that her personally becoming a
vegetarian won't make any difference to the overall utility. Because the meat and animal products industry
is so huge and markets are too insensitive, no consequence of her becoming a vegetarian, or even a
vegan, would be that fewer animals would be raised and killed than if she were to continue in her

omnivorous ways. While these industries do exist only because people buy their products, they don't exist
because she buys their products, and they won't come tumbling down if she divests herself from them. If
she is supposed to become a vegetarian or vegan because doing so will help the plight of animals, this
seems to not be the case.
Call this the "impotence of the individual" objection. It obviously depends on an empirical assumption
concerning the failure of an individual's consumer behavior to affect a huge industry. This claim seems
20
plausible; it is even accepted by a number of philosophers who defend vegetarianism. As far as I know,
nobody has summoned the empirical data to show that it is false. I will presume it is true and so here's the
rub: if an individual's refraining from purchasing animal-based products does not make a difference for the
animals, then this critic might think that Singer's argument is sound, but that it just does not imply the
relevant conclusion, namely that she should become a vegetarian. The conclusion seems to be that it
ought to be the case that we all become vegetarians, which is importantly different from the conclusion
that she ought to be vegetarian, irrespective of whether others do the same (for one difference, the critic
can make it the case that she is vegetarian, but her powers over others are quite limited). A
consequentialist case for personal vegetarianism or veganism, if it can be made, will thereby have to be
made on the actual positive consequences of an individual's becoming a vegetarian, and it appears that
less animals being raised and killed is, unfortunately, not one of the actual consequences.
This problem is not unique to consequentialism, since it plagues Regan's account of animal rights as well.
Suppose animals do have moral rights that make it, at least, wrong to cause them to have lives full of pain
and suffering and, at most, wrong to kill them painlessly for no reason other that many find them tasty to
eat and fashionable to wear. A critic might object that since he's not killing them, he's not violating their
rights. Again, since the market is so big and his share of the purchases so small, his refraining from
purchasing these products will not result in any less animals' rights being violated either. And his eating
the last burger at the picnic won't result in any more animal's rights being violated. So, even if animals
have rights, in itself this does seem to directly support personal vegetarianism, unless animals have an
additional right not to be purchased, eaten, worn, and so on, even after they are dead. But this is doubtful.
Additional premises are needed here, as in Singer's case, to render personal vegetarianism obligatory.
Recent Non-Theory Based Work on Vegetarianism
A number of recent attempts have been made to simplify the arguments for vegetarianism and not have
them rely on what some see as unnecessarily complicated, controversial, and dubious premises such as
that "all animals are equal," that speciesism is wrong, that animals have rights, that animals are persons
or subjects of experience, or that some particular ethical theory is correct. These approaches are also
subject to the same kind of objection as above, basically the "How will there be more good in the world if /
become a vegetarian (or vegan)?" objection, and so do not succeed in the eyes of the consequentialist
critic.
In Andrew Tardiff s "Simplifying the Case for Vegetarianism,"21 he shows that we all believe that if we can
very easily spare an animal's life (e.g., by changing our walking pace to avoid stepping on and killing a
small animal) at the expense of a plant (or even the "cost" of keeping a clump of dirt intact) then we
should do so. This is because we believe there are morally relevant differences between, on the one
hand, animals and, on the other, plants and other inanimate objects. Tardiff also points out that we
believe that if killing a plant will result in equal or greater good for us, compared to killing an animal, then
we believe that we should kill the plant and spare the animal.
From these premises about the moral priority of animals over plants and the empirical premises that we
don't need to kill animals for our survival and that, in fact, a plant-based diet can contribute to optimal
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human health, Tardiff concludes that "we ought not kill animals for food." Presumably, analogous
arguments would conclude that animals ought not be killed for other products as well.
These arguments may be sound, but unfortunately again they do not strictly imply that it's wrong to buy
and/or eat meat and use other animal products. This is because most meat eaters do not kill animals for
food: they buy their products at a store. So Tardiff’s argument does not establish its intended conclusion.
To do this he would need to defend a premise that it's wrong to purchase or use products that have their
origins in wrongdoing, which he does not do. He claims that "[n]o one loses a job if [he] stop[s]
23
participating in the killing of animals for food by becoming a vegetarian." But if this is so, then it is
doubtful that any animal is spared by his actions either. Thus, Tardiffs argument does not succeed in
establishing personal vegetarianism.
In "The Immorality of Eating Meat," Mylan Engel argues that the view that "eating meat is immoral" follows
from a set of ordinary moral beliefs that most people already hold. These beliefs concern the badness of
unnecessary pain and suffering (for both humans and animals), and the belief that morally decent people
do what they can, at least, to avoid making the world a worse place, in terms of increasing (undeserved)
suffering, especially when they can easily do so.
24

Engel claims that if one accepts these moral premises (or various subsets of them) and the facts about
animal rearing and slaughter conditions (and the environmental and public health consequences of
factory farming) and the facts about the health advantages of an animal-free diet, but denies that he or
she ought to not buy and eat meat, animal food products, and other animal-based products when crueltyfree alternatives are comparatively priced and readily available, then that person is being inconsistent.
This is because, according to Engel, these premises "entail that eating meat is morally wrong and ipso
25
facto that vegetarianism is morally required."
But if an individual's purchases have no causal influence on the plight of animals, then many of Engel's
26
entailments do not hold because, for the most part, an individual's not buying and eating meat and other
animal products will not result in less pain, suffering, and death for animals or any less environmental
degradation. Even if Engel is correct that a minimally decent individual, "would take steps to reduce the
amount of unnecessary pain and suffering in the world, ifs/he could do so with very little effort on his/her
27
part,” since an individual's meat-abstention can't do anything to make the world a better place, at least
not for animals, as Engel seems to suggest, his argument does not succeed.
28

In "A New Argument for Vegetarianism," Jordan Cumutt hopes to get beyond what he calls the
"stalemates" of the traditional debates by defending an argument for vegetarianism that "does not depend
29
on calculations of utility, any particular conception of rights, or the imposition of pain and suffering." He
30
says his argument will "traverse a relatively uncontroversial theoretical region." His main premises
concern the wrongness of causing unnecessary pain, suffering, and death for animals because these are
31
harms and causing harm is prima facie wrong.
But even if we grant the premise that animals' suffering and death are harms and causing these harms is
wrong, we find the problem we saw before: how does it follow that it's wrong for an individual to buy and
eat animals, since he or she did not kill them? Curnutt admits that "as a matter of economic fact, [his]
refraining from eating animals will not affect the meat industry in the least. The loss of [his] financial
contribution will not spare a single animal from harm, nor produce the slightest setback of the business;
32
[he] will be preventing no future wrongdoing whatever by becoming a vegetarian." Since his
contributions are causally inefficacious, the chain from the wrongness of killing animals to the wrongness
of an individual's buying and eating them seems to be broken.

In response to this problem, Curnutt considers two proposals: first, that while raising and killing animals
are wrong, meat purchasing and eating are not, strictly speaking, wrong, but we should act as if they are;
33
and, second, that the wrongness of the killing "transfers" to the wrongness of the consumption. He
resists both these strategies: "Animal eating is itself wrong, but this is not due to any 'transference' of
wrongness to the act of purchasing and eating animal flesh. The purchasing and consuming are two parts
34
of the same wrong."
To make his perspective vivid, he develops an analogy. Someone says:
This is a lovely lamp. You say its base is made from the bones and the shade from the
skin of Jews killed in concentration camps? Well, so what? I didn't kill them. Of course
what the Nazis did was wrong, a great moral evil. But my not buying the lamp is obviously
not going to bring any of them back. Nor will it prevent any future harm: this sort of thing
doesn't even occur anymore, so there is no future wrongdoing to prevent even if my
refusal to buy were effective in this way, which of course it wouldn't be. So what's wrong
35
with buying and using the lamp?
Curnutt believes that animal-purchasing and eating is wrong for the same reasons that it would typically
be wrong to buy and use this lamp or other products from a concentration camp, or buy clothing produced
by slave labor, or buy stolen property. In each of these cases, Cumutt holds, one benefits from the "illgotten gains from another" and "profit[s] [and] benefit[s] from a morally nefarious practice," and this is
36
wrong. William Stephens asks similar questions about whether "finding and wearing, but not purchasing,
a necklace made from the finger bones of a murdered man, or a jacket made from the tanned skin of a
37
murdered woman, would be morally objectionable."
It does seem that there is something objectionable about enjoying products that have their sources in evil,
even if refraining from purchasing or using them wouldn't (or couldn't) improve the plights of those who
have suffered to make them. Curnutt states a principle to defend this intuition and explicitly link the
wrongness of harming animals in farms and slaughterhouses to the individual's purchases and/or
consumption:
If "one … concurs and cooperates with wrongdoing, … [and] gamers benefits through the
defeat of basic welfare interests of others, [then one] is ... doing something which is
38
seriously morally wrong,"
He claims that this strikes him as "quite uncontroversial." Unfortunately, this principle is controversial: it
might seem true when, by refraining from participating in a practice, one actually prevents some evil from
occurring, but it is not as easy to see why this principle is true in cases where an individual's participation
makes no difference, and we've presumed that this is the case, at least for the animals.
So Curnutt's defense of vegetarianism comes down to a principle that he finds quite uncontroversial but is
controversial, and he provides little defense of the principle beyond his saying that he believes it to be
true. However, it seems that a premise like this is likely to be needed for an adequate defense of personal
vegetarianism or veganism. To defend vegetarianism from a consequentialist perspective, it will need to
be shown that a principle like Curnutt's follows from the general consequentialist moral principle. Later I
will attempt to do this.
Clear Consequences of Vegetarianism
So where are we? One route is to abandon the idea that, in becoming a vegetarian or vegan, one is
actually helping suffering animals and that this is a reason to do so. If we go this route, then the case has

to be made wholly on the basis of concerns that don't have much to do with animals: improved personal
health and well-being, a longer lifespan, and lower costs associated with healthcare. Since a vegan
lifestyle is cheaper, as meat and animal-products are a luxury, one could forgo them and use that savings
to bring about greater goods, for example, by supporting organizations that save people who, unlike
livestock, are starving to death or are chronically malnourished. While one's not purchasing animal
products won't make a difference to the meat industry, providing support for smaller vegetarian-product
companies might. There, even an individual's financial contributions, as well as his or her trying a product
and telling others about it, might very well make a difference to the fate of a product or company. Finally,
many people find great value in the friendships they develop in the vegetarian community: being among
and working with people who advocate healthful and compassionate living can be quite rewarding.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people who adopt this kind of lifestyle find their lives to have
greater meaning and purpose, compared to when they were not vegetarians or vegans.
It might be that the consequentialist argument can run on these considerations alone and get one very
close to the vegan conclusion: it might be that for each opportunity to buy, eat, or use an animal product,
there is nearly always something better that one can purchase, eat, or use that does not involve animals.
Going these routes can plausibly be said to result in better consequences for one's health and finances
and so better enable one to bring about more goods for others, as well as one's self.
Vegetarianism and Virtue
However, omitting direct considerations about animals as reasons to be a vegetarian does seem to miss
something important. One way to make animal-based concerns relevant is to think of the vegetarian in
terms of his or her virtues. While Tardiff does not present his case as a virtue-based one, he does
describe the meat eater as "selfish," in that she accepts the system of killing animals for her own
pleasure; he also describes the ethical vegetarian as "generous," "compassionate," and "peace-loving."39
Stephens suspects that a "compassionate person would feel moral discomfort, or even revulsion,
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enjoying something made possible only by the suffering of another." Dixon argues that an individual who
thinks it is wrong to cause animals to suffer and be killed for food yet continues to eat meat "seems to be
41
guilty of a lack of integrity."
The common suggestion is that one should be a vegetarian or a vegan because, given an understanding
of the relevant facts about both animal and human suffering, this is just how a virtuous, good person
would respond. Since people should be virtuous, and being virtuous entails being caring and
compassionate (among having other traits), and these traits entail disassociation from the animalproducts industry even if doing so won't result in less harm to animals, virtuous people should be
vegetarian.
In exploring a virtue-based defense of vegetarianism, Russ Shafer-Landau suggests that meat-eaters
may be "condemnable to the extent that they display an indifference to the cruelty that went into the
'production' of their 'goods'," and that "they demonstrate a disregard for the suffering experienced by the
animals whose remains one is wearing or eating." He describes fur-wearers as "callous." He writes that
"[s]eeking and deriving satisfaction from 'products' that are known to result from cruel practices
diminishes one's admirability. This is so even if the practical impact of one's indulgence is nonexistent or
negligible." Similar judgments are made outside of the vegetarian context: there is "something morally
repugnant about a willingness to utilize or purchase soap made from the bodies of concentration camp
victims," even if doing so won't prevent any future harms. Also, voicing one's support for a racist dictator
42
or wearing a fur coat received as a gift both seem objectionable.

From these intuitions, Shafer-Landau formulates a moral principle similar to Curnutt's: "One must refuse
(even symbolic) support of essentially cruel practices, if a comparably costly alternative that is not tied to
43
essentially cruel practices is readily available." He suspects that something like this principle offers the
best hope for those concerned to defend the existence of an obligation to refrain from animal
consumption. The problem here, as he notes, is that it's not easy "to identify the sorts of considerations
44
that can ground such a principle," or to find a general moral theory that would justify such a principle.
One approach would be to go the route of a rule-based non-consequentialist or deontological ethic, and
hold that this is one of the rules. However, this probably wouldn't be wise, since an ethic of rules is often
45
thought to be "fundamentally non-explanatory" and "anti-theoretical." Presumably, there is a unifying
principle that makes these rules the right rules: if there is such a principle, then this is what justifies the
rule and makes it the case that the rule should be followed. This fundamental principle is thereby of
theoretical interest, not the mid-level rule.
Another route would be virtue ethics. Virtue ethics says, roughly, that evaluations of character and motive
are primary in ethics and that other ethical evaluations—say of actions—are derivative from
considerations of character and motive: for example, that an action is right if, and only if, a virtuous
46
person would do it. The morality of an action is to be explained by the character of the agent. If one is
interested in defending vegetarianism or veganism (and other intuitions about concerned and responsible
consumer behavior in general), and one suspects that non-virtue-based theories have a hard time
generating the correct judgments about these cases, then one might have a good reason to take more
47
interest in virtue-based ethical theory. It just seems that a virtuous person would not, in response to an
understanding of the facts about animal agriculture and nutrition, think that even though animals suffer
greatly and die for these products that she does not need (and, in fact, are sometimes harmful to her) and
thus only fulfill aesthetic preferences for her, she is nevertheless justified in consuming and using them,
even though she could easily refrain from doing so. Thus, virtue theory seems to provide a ready defense
for a general principle, similar to Curnutt's and Shafer-Landau's, that we shouldn't (even symbolically)
support bad practices when good alternatives are readily available, which we might call the "vegetarian
justifying principle."
Virtue theory's greatest "vice," however, is that it simply does not seem to provide much of an explanation
for why it's good to be virtuous, for example, why it's good (or virtuous) to be compassionate or why a
virtuous person would accept the vegetarian justifying principle. Consequentialists can plausibly argue
that it's good to be compassionate because compassionate people tend to bring more happiness into the
world. They see the virtues as instrumentally valuable: virtue ethics, at least in its bolder varieties (and the
non-bold varieties seem to just be theories of the virtues, which don't imply anything about ethical theory),
holds that the virtues are intrinsically valuable.
In taking a consequentialist view on the virtues, one attempts to give more basic reasons why someone
should be compassionate (assuming compassion is a virtue), not merely asserting, as virtue ethics does,
that it's just a brute, unexplained fact that compassion is good. The consequentialist critic, of course, will
be more attracted to the option that it's a brute fact that, say, happiness or pleasure is good and that
virtues are means to those ends. This seems more likely than the idea that the virtues are ends in
themselves or are intrinsically good.
If this criticism of virtue ethics is compelling, then while virtue ethics does readily support vegetarianism, it
lacks explanatory power. The theory-minded ethical vegetarian seems to be faced with a dilemma: either
accept a generally plausible ethical theory (e.g., consequentialism) that gets a broad range of cases right
(and for seemingly good reasons) but doesn't seem to do as well with personal vegetarianism or
veganism in that it seems to lack a place for concerns about animals to provide reasons for action, or

adopt a virtue ethics or other non-consequentialist, rule-based perspective that readily supports
vegetarianism or veganism but, unfortunately, doesn't amount to much of a general moral theory because
it lacks explanatory power.
I suspect that there may be a compromise here, one that will be amenable to consequentialists and help
them defend the vegetarian justifying principle. There already are reasons to believe that the locus of
evaluation for consequentialism should be broadened beyond individual actions to include the "life
48
histories" of a person. One proposal is to hold that an individual action is right for a person just in case it
is part of one of that person's optimal life histories, that is, a life history in which value is maximized over
the span of the life.
And here we have a natural place to merge the plausible insights of virtue ethics with consequentialist
ethical theory. Pre-theoretically, it seems that, all else equal, a person will bring about more goodness if
she has the virtue of compassion, cares about and is sensitive to unnecessary cruelty and suffering
(wherever it is found, in humans or animals), opposes injustice and unfairness, and, in general, attempts
to have an integrated, coherent moral outlook. These seem to be virtues that we try to instill in our
children. And earlier we saw that these virtues (and others) readily support vegetarianism and veganism,
as well as a general moral outlook typically associated with them (e.g., deep concerns about human
health and the recognition that the most effective ways to promote this are through simple dietary
49
changes and non-animal based medical research, disappointments that people are starving to death
while cattle are well-fed, environmental concerns, concern for public health and safety, concerns for the
safety of slaughterhouse workers, and so on).
These virtues have deep implications for how one lives one's life and how one affects others' lives. For
each person, it is unclear how their characters would not be improved and how they would fail to bring
about more goodness were they to adopt the virtues that commonly motivate vegetarian or veganism.
What other better character traits would preclude doing this? Becoming caring and compassionate about
animals invariably seems to have "trickle down" positive effects for the rest of one's life. It seems
exceedingly unlikely that anyone would, in general, come to treat other humans worse were she to
become a vegetarian or vegan out of compassion or sympathy for animals. In fact, the opposite seems
likely. One common motive for telling others about the plight of animals, and attempting to persuade them
to be vegetarian or vegan, is that others' lives will improve and they will develop these virtues.
One could practice these virtues selectively and not have them affect one's views about animals, or allow
one's self to occasionally eat, but probably not buy, meat (whatever amount won't have negative
consequences for health, which is unknown). In doing so, however, it seems not unlikely that one would
be taking oneself down a life history that would be, on balance, worse than the vegan one. This is
because, first, a thoughtful humanist should probably come to conclusions about how to behave that
would be very similar to the vegan's (since all their prescriptions promote human well-being anyway) and,
second, personal consistency, integrity and commitment typically contribute to better character anyway. It
might be difficult to be selectively caring and compassionate: if this would lead one down a slippery slope,
the better strategy for doing the best one can with one's life might be to consistently hold these virtues
and act in accordance with them. If this is the case, this bridges the gap between the consequentialist
case for near-vegetarianism or veganism articulated above and the more consistent outlook, character,
and behavior that many vegetarian and vegan philosophers advocate.
Singer states that "becoming a vegetarian [or a vegan, I think he'd agree] is a way of attesting to the
depth and sincerity of one's belief in the wrongness of what we are doing to animals."50 He probably
would agree that veganism also is a way to attest to the sincerity of one's belief in the wrongness of what
happens to humans as a result of how animals are used. I suspect that, in general, a person who has

these beliefs and attests to them by becoming a vegetarian or vegan brings more goodness into the world
than her non-vegetarian counterpart: some of these ways are more obvious (e.g., health, comparative
ability to make financial contributions to good causes), others are less obvious and, of course, harder to
evaluate (e.g., consequences of character). If a switch to a vegetarian or vegan lifestyle results in a life
history that brings about greater overall value than an omnivorous life history, then this is what
consequentialism demands, and, therefore, consequentialism does not demand "too little" because it will
require that one conform one's behavior to the "vegetarian justifying principle" (which has implications
beyond vegetarianism).
In conclusion, my discussion can be presented as this argument:
(1) If consequentialism is true, then S ought to live an optimal life history.
(2) If S ought to live an optimal life history, then S ought to have the virtues entailed by
an optimal life history.
(3) If S ought to have the virtues entailed by an optimal life history, then S ought to be
compassionate, sensitive to cruelty (wherever it is found), resist injustice, have moral
integrity, etc.
(4) If S ought to be compassionate, sensitive to cruelty (wherever it is found), resist
injustice, and be morally integrated, etc., then S ought to be a vegetarian or vegan.
(5) Therefore, if consequentialism is true, then S ought to be a vegetarian or vegan.

Consequentialists readily accept premise (1) and should accept premise (2) as well, since it explains why
it's good to be virtuous. Premise (3) is defended by the quasi-empirical observation that people with these
and related virtues tend to, in general and all else being equal, bring about more good in the world than
people who lack these virtues. Were major lifestyle changes not at stake, many would probably readily
accept this premise: it is difficult to see how people who lack compassion, caring, and sensitivity would
bring about more goods than those who have these traits, or have them to a greater degree.
Premise (4) is obviously difficult, since it concerns empirical matters. It is the claim that people who
become vegetarians or vegans in order to more consistently practice virtue produce more overall good
than those who dabble in virtue or practice it selectively. Admittedly, this is an exceedingly difficult
premise to defend. The data regarding the positive consequences of changing one's character by
becoming vegetarian are, for the most part, anecdotal and speculative. However, this is a problem in
general for trying to defend any view about personal morality from a consequentialist perspective, since it
is very difficult to find any hard data on the consequences of character and lifestyle. Intuitions and
impressions are often all we have to go on for such matters, especially those concerning personal choice.
But that does not leave us in the dark, since one impression that most of us have is that it is better to be
more compassionate and caring, compared to less, unless doing so would be emotionally draining, which
being a vegetarian typically isn't (in fact, many find it quite uplifting). Furthermore, whatever other projects
we have, it is unclear exactly how becoming a vegetarian could preclude our efforts with them: if our other
projects are noble, it is likely that our reasons for doing them would support being a vegetarian as well.
So, while (4) is not easy to defend on consequentialist grounds, it is not easy to deny either. The
vegetarian consequentialist typically has some personal experience to justify her sense that her becoming
a vegetarian or vegan has resulted in her bringing about better consequences, while the critic typically

has little personal experience to think that her being an omnivore has had the best consequences. If this
consequentialist strategy for defending personal vegetarianism has promise, further research into the
actual consequences of having the kind of character that is receptive to concerns about animal suffering
will be necessary. Until then, I hope that some burden has been shifted to those who hold that their
becoming vegetarians or vegans would not maximize intrinsic value to explain why this is so and why
their characters, and the consequences of their characters, would become worse for their making this
51
change.
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